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1. Introduction
Welfare states have traditionally had a high degree of closure, not just to  persons, 
but to providers. On the supply side, it is not easy to enter the market either 
because of very strict, sometimes exclusionary regulations, or because the ﬁ eld 
is dominated by (quasi-) monopolistic, (quasi-) public institutions. One cannot 
simply open a university or hospital in the way that one could open a shop, and 
even if one could, one probably would not get any customers because established 
ﬁ nancial incentives would steer them towards existing players.¹ On the demand 
side, consumers usually have a limited amount of choice of provider, and even 
when consumer choice is a principle built into the system, it is often deprived of 
some of its substance by rules severely standardizing the range of services which 
may be oﬀ ered; you can have any treatment you want as long as it’s the one 
that the state approves. And if one can and does simply opt-out and go to a for-
eign or alternative or simply new provider of services then the chances are that 
this has dire ﬁ nancial consequences; the state only pays if you use its preferred 
institutions.²
Th ese regulatory and institutional aspects of the welfare state restrict compe-
tition and free movement of services, something of increasing importance now 
that the concept of economic activity in the relevant law—that of the EU internal 
market—is coming to encompass activities that not very long ago were seen as 
¹ See eg K. Stöger ,’Th e freedom of establishment and the market access of hospital opera-
tors’ (2006) 17 Eur Business L Rev 1545; Case C-153/02 Neri v ESE [2003] ECR I-13555; 
E. Manganaris, ‘Th e principle of supremacy of Community law in Greece—from direct challenge 
to non-application’ (1999) 24 ELR 426.
² See eg Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325; Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré and van 
Riet [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473; Case 
C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-76/05 Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849; joined cases 
C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161.
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inherently non-market.³ Th at change is likely to snowball since the potential 
markets involved, for health, education, and social insurance, are vast. Health and 
social insurance dwarf any other industry found in the developed world.⁴ Th is 
ensures that lobbying for increased opportunities to participate in that market—to 
share in the potential proﬁ ts—will be intense and well-backed. Since liberaliza-
tion—used here to mean an increase in the scope of free choice allowed to provid-
ers and consumers—can also be presented as a force for increased eﬃ  ciency and 
empowerment of individual consumers, there is a conjunction of perspectives and 
interests that seems likely to keep the process going for some way yet.⁵
Th e initial fears that such a process arouses are that consumers who are either 
poor or particularly needy of services—for example the chronically ill—will 
be unable to get what they need. Free markets means free pricing which means 
that not everyone will have the same purchasing power, and some will not have 
enough. Hence if the widely shared European ideal of universal access to impor-
tant welfare services, on more or less equal terms, is to be maintained there is a 
need for policies balancing, limiting, or managing the relevant market.⁶
In practice, the powers-that-be have taken this lesson to heart. In the Treaty, sec-
ondary legislation, and case law of the Court of Justice there is repeated acknowl-
edgment that both free movement and competition may be limited where this is 
necessary to protect other important social interests, notably universal access to 
solidarity-based welfare services or the maintenance of the institutions that pro-
vide them. One may think here of the acknowledgment that paying for hospital 
treatment abroad at the will of the patient could undermine the stability of health 
systems, and the subsequent partial subordination of free movement to that latter 
interest, or the restrictions on competition accepted in a number of social insur-
ance cases in the interests of maintaining solidarity-based systems, but there are 
also numerous other examples of careful balancing and acknowledgment of the 
risks of over-liberalization.⁷
However, the justiﬁ cations that are acknowledged here could be described 
as ‘functional’ and contrasted with more subtle social justiﬁ cations which have 
not been explicitly addressed. It is the contrast between these two types of justi-
ﬁ cations which is the subject of this chapter. It will be suggested that the latter 
³ See G. Davies, ‘Th e process and side-eﬀ ects of harmonisation of European welfare states’, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 02/06, <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org> 17–28.
⁴ ibid 81–83.
⁵ See G. Davies, ‘Th e eﬀ ect of Mrs Watts’ trip to France on the NHS’ (2007) Kings LJ 158, 
165–166; Case T-289/03 BUPA v Commission [2008] ECR II-81.
⁶ F. Scharpf, ‘Th e European social model: coping with the challenges of diversity’ (2002) 40 J of 
Common Market Studies 645.
⁷ Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, annotated by M. Flear, (2004) 41 CML 
Rev 209; Case C-159/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637; Case C-70/96 Sodemare [1997] ECR 
I-3395; Case C-264/01 AOK [2004] ECR I-2493; Case C-115/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025; 
C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999] ECR I-6021; Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691; Case 
C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089; Case T-289/03 BUPA v Commission [2008] 
ECR II-81.
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sort—which might perhaps be called communitarian, given their valuing of 
unity and mutual obligation over individual choice⁸—are simply too amorphous 
for judicial review, and that this raises severe problems for the application of 
internal market law, with the risks involved being on the one hand a possible 
collapse into protectionism, or even nationalism, and on the other a dismantling of 
social cohesion which threatens quality of life, solidarity, and ultimately identity.
2. Th e role of institutions
Restrictions on market freedom serve to reduce diversity and restrict innovation—
that is one objection to them. However, it is also an advantage. Th ey create a degree 
of uniformity and of institutional stability. Th ey also create a sense of institution; 
even if on a formal legal level providers of services are independent or diverse, if 
regulation constrains them so tightly that they are forced to operate in the same 
way, oﬀ er the same services at the same prices, and treat their clients identically, 
then the distinction between the providers becomes less apparent to the client and 
accordingly less important. Th e more these providers are regulated, the more they 
seem to customers to be part of a single body. Th is explains why continental social-
insurance based systems, where provision of services is privatized but highly regu-
lated, are nevertheless perceived as containing public welfare institutions.⁹ Th is 
institutional perception, and reality, has (at least) three consequences for the pub-
lic which are worth noting: uniformity, shared experience, and aligned interests.
2.1. Uniformity
Equality is a nebulous concept, most signiﬁ cantly because it acquires useful 
meaning only if one can answer the question ‘equality of what’ with reasonable 
precision.¹⁰ It is a transitive concept that is often used intransitively, with a con-
sequent loss of clarity. In the context of welfare, the view that all citizens should 
be treated as ‘equal’ by the system is usually uncontroversial. However, trans-
lating this into concrete policy immediately raises less easily resolved issues.¹¹ Do 
⁸ See eg A. Etzioni, New Communitarian Th inking (University Press of Virginia, 1996); 
C. Newdick, ‘Citizenship, free movement, and healthcare: cementing individual rights by 
corroding social solidarity’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1645, at 1645–1646.
⁹ B. Rothstein, ‘Social capital in the social democratic welfare state’ (2001) 29 Politics and 
Society 207,
¹⁰ See eg A. Sen, ‘Equality of what?’ in R. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds), Contemporary Political 
Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell 2005); R. Dworkin, ‘What is equality? Part 1: equal-
ity of welfare’ (1981) 10(3) Philosophy and Public Aﬀ airs 185–246, and ‘What is equality? Part 2: 
equality of resources’ (1981) 10(4) Philosophy and Public Aﬀ airs 283–345; E. Anderson, ‘What is 
the point of equality?’ (1999) 109 Ethics 287–337.
¹¹ W. Korpi and J. Palme, ‘Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries’ (1998) 63(5) 
American Sociological Rev 661–687.
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student loans violate equality, or reﬂ ect the idea of ‘equal opportunity’? Can 
‘equality’ in healthcare be coherently limited to ensuring everyone has basic 
essential services, or must it entail ensuring identical services to all citizens, and 
perhaps even prohibiting the purchase of extra luxury? Does a desire for equality 
for all children in the education system mean that there must be compulsory mix-
ing of diﬀ erent social groups to avoid ghettoization, or does freedom of choice for 
every parent, the same terms oﬀ ered to all, best embody the ideal? Th e risk of dis-
cussing such issues in terms of equality, particularly in its more complex forms, 
is that informed consideration of substantive social issues comes to be displaced 
by sterile theory. It may then become attractive to retreat, or advance, to an 
apparently simpler and more formal notion of equality, that of uniform treat-
ment, a value found to a great extent in continental European social-democratic 
welfare states.¹² Although it is well-known that treating all the same works to the 
advantage of some and the disadvantage of others, nevertheless the attractiveness 
of uniformity is the high level of transparency, predictability, and certainty that 
it brings.¹³ Th e idea that all children, patients, and students will have the same 
rules, treatment, and principles applied to them is relatively easy to build a social 
consensus around, and by making equality functional and comprehensible—if 
arguably less equal—can turn it into a collective value that has a social as well as 
functional role. It minimizes group identity in favour of broader collective iden-
tity. Th at is controversial, but in some societies attracts support that is not purely 
majoritarian assertiveness.¹⁴ A republican uniform treatment ideal can help us 
feel bonded with our fellow denizens, whoever they may be and however we may 
diﬀ er from them, as well as reinforcing, in some eyes, an image of the state as 
neutral between groups.
Th is uniformity is much easier to achieve in a tight, institutionalized welfare 
system. Diverse provision and consumer choice can be defended and explained 
in equality terms, but it is the more amorphous ‘equality of opportunity’ or 
‘freedom of choice for everyone on the same terms’ which comes into play. Th e 
reality is that diversity will result in diﬀ erent qualities of service and experi-
ence, and those diﬀ erences will be understood as part of the system rather than 
merely a defect in it. Th e social value which markets embody is, of course, in-
dividualism more than equality; they allow us to emphasize what makes us dif-
ferent, not what makes us the same. Th e role of a market-based welfare system in 
social cohesion and community-building is distinctively diﬀ erent from that of a 
uniformity-based one.
¹² See G. Esping-Anderson, Th e Th ree Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990).
¹³ See J. Baldock, ‘On being a welfare consumer in a consumer society’ (2003) 2 Social Policy 
and Society 65, at 67.
¹⁴ On this issue see eg C. McCrudden, ‘Th eorising European equality law’ in C. Costello and 
E. Barry (eds) Equality in Diversity: Th e New Equality Directives (Irish Centre for European Law, 
2003) 1, 20–31, and citations therein; A. Vakulenko, ‘Islamic dress in human rights jurisprudence: 
a critique of current trends’ (2007) 7 Human Rights L Rev 717.
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2.2. Shared experience
In a modern European welfare state almost all citizens participate in recognizably 
similar institutions and have a similar relationship with them. It is hard to think 
of any other institution or socially constructed context which is shared in the 
same way by people of almost all incomes, classes, races, religions and lifestyles. 
Th e media is more divided, and public transport is less used by the rich, and 
neither, in any case, touch on the crucial and vulnerable moments of life in the 
way that welfare services do. Th ere was, brieﬂ y, perhaps a time when all Britons 
watched the BBC, but within the realm of the social and governmental it is now 
probably the institutions of the welfare state that oﬀ er the broadest and deep-
est shared experience. If we look for a project that we are all participating in, an 
interaction with the state that is common to us all, and a positioning in the public 
sphere that does not depend upon our background or social position, then the 
institutionalized, uniform, welfare state provides this. Th is is a political sphere 
where we can recognize the experiences of others whose life is otherwise dramati-
cally diﬀ erent from our own, and as such it contributes to our sense that we are 
part of a community, doing something together, and living linked lives.¹⁵
2.3. Aligned interests
Th ere is an obvious conﬂ ict of interests between those who have money and those 
who do not. In the context of welfare that conﬂ ict can be extended to those who 
have a limited need for welfare services—perhaps no longer in need of education, 
or work-related social insurance, or apparently in good health—and those with 
a particularly high need—the chronically ill being a notable example. Creating a 
system in which privileged groups agree to subsidize others is a political challenge 
that has to be met in order for ideals of universality to be maintained.
One way of doing this is to appeal to morality or philanthropy. Another way is 
to create shared institutions that service all groups. Of course, some groups would 
be advantaged by creating separate institutions for themselves, but this requires 
an extra energy or initiative. If they are already invested in the shared institution, 
part of it, used to it, comfortable with it, then the chance is greater that they will 
be prepared to ﬁ ght for its maintenance and improvement—which then also ben-
eﬁ ts the less privileged users too.¹⁶ By contrast, if there is fragmentation of service 
provision, then it is likely that providers will partly come to service consumer 
groups deﬁ ned along the lines of social division, wealth and class and religion and 
race and so on. Moreover, the links between the groups are then embodied only 
in the system of taxation and redistribution, not in shared institutions. In these 
more distanced circumstances it is a smaller intellectual leap for some groups to 
¹⁵ B. Rothstein, n 9 above, 234.   ¹⁶ ibid.
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imagine being cut free, able to invest only in themselves. Fragmentation threat-
ens political support for solidarity.¹⁷
It does this in one more way too. In many contexts people are prepared to pay 
for security and predictability. It is a truism that insurance is a bad buy except 
when it is for catastrophic events—losses which one could not otherwise aﬀ ord. 
Apart from these, it is better value to bear the risk oneself, since insurance com-
panies will always take care that their premiums on average amount to more than 
one is likely to receive. Yet people buy insurance even for aﬀ ordable risks, because 
it brings a certainty and predictability which reduces stress and improves quality 
of life. And why not? What better thing to spend money on?
Monopolistic welfare institutions can be understood partly in similar terms. 
Individuals might be able to get a better deal if they were not part of the bigger sys-
tem and did not have to subsidize the less fortunate. However, they cannot be sure 
that their own good fortune will continue. Moreover, most people have some others 
that they care about. Th ey cannot be sure that these will also continue to be light 
users of the welfare state. Paying over the odds today is also paying an insurance 
premium in a broad sense; contributing to the political sustainability of a system 
which ensures that one does not need to worry about the ﬁ nancing of one’s future 
welfare. By contributing to solidarity now, one strengthens a social norm, and 
strengthens a system embodying that norm, which one may need in the future.¹⁸
Th e greater the sense of institution, or of system, the better this works.¹⁹ Th e 
individual’s ﬁ nancial contribution to solidarity is the same in a market or a non-
market system, but this is not all that matters. Th ey also make a participatory con-
tribution, by using an institution that others use. Here they can stand among those 
they do not know and feel a sense of belonging and connection. A system in which 
bad luck might well project them into diﬀ erent schools, hospitals, systems, is one 
they will feel less inclined to invest in. Th ose diﬀ erent institutions may be nomi-
nally ‘equivalent’—access to basic services may be guaranteed—but there is fear of 
the unknown and there is the fact that diﬀ erent is never quite equal. Knowing that 
a particular, known, trusted, institution is yours and your family’s whatever your 
circumstances—that can motivate a privileged individual to buy into the system 
now and keep defending it. And one may note here that the privileged can be good 
at defending; they have political ability and power. If they opt out, they care less.
Groups whose interests are apparently opposed can therefore come to perceive 
that they have a shared self-interest, the one group because they need now, and 
the other group because they realize that they may need tomorrow. Th is virtuous 
position relies on trust that ‘philanthropy’ today will be returned tomorrow if it 
¹⁷ See J. Kääriäinen and H. Lehtoninen, ‘Th e variety of social capital in welfare state regimes —a 
comparison of 21 countries’ (2006) 8 Eur Societies 27; M. Meier Jaeger, ‘Welfare regimes and atti-
tudes towards redistribution: the regime hypothesis revisited’ (2006) 22 Eur Sociological Rev 157.
¹⁸ J. Hassler, J. V. R. Mora, K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti, ‘Th e Survival of the Welfare State’ 
(August 2001) CEPR Discussion Paper No 2905. Available on <http://ssrn.com>.
¹⁹ ibid 3.
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is needed, and that trust is strengthened when institutions are shared. Th ere is no 
other service provider to which the privileged can turn; they have to maintain this 
one. Th at serves as a guarantee for the future. Of course, systems can be changed, 
but this takes time and energy. No-one wants to be the ﬁ rst to opt-out, because 
being alone outside the system is not advantageous even for most net payers. Inertia, 
and the risk entailed in being the ﬁ rst to try and exit the system, mean that the guar-
antee entailed in the monolithic system is not empty, albeit not cast-iron either.
2.4. An insight from Hirschman’s voice and exit
Hirschman described how customers of an organization have two tactics they can 
use to inﬂ uence its behaviour; voice or exit. Which of these they are likely to choose 
for in particular circumstances, and which choice leads to more desirable results 
for themselves or the organization, was described in his classic Voice, Exit and 
Loyalty, which was partly intended as a rebuttal of economists’ tendency to adopt 
the over-simpliﬁ ed assumption that markets always work by customers switching 
provider (exiting) when they are not satisﬁ ed.²⁰ He suggested that they might also 
remain as customers but try and persuade the organization to change (voice), and 
that this might sometimes be an eﬃ  cient and desirable course of action.²¹
One of the points he makes in the course of his discussion is that exit can 
actually be a boon to monopolists.²² One might assume that any business desires 
as many customers as possible, and the monopolist is particularly happy to have 
all of them, with the extra pricing opportunities that this entails. Yet he sug-
gests that there is often a minority of customers who are particularly demanding, 
and a majority who are somewhat more inertial, more likely to accept whatever 
service they are oﬀ ered without fuss. Th is comment certainly resonates in an 
analysis of welfare states. He then points out that if these demanding customers 
are denied exit—as for example where education or healthcare is provided via a 
single homogenous and quasi-monopolistic provider or system—they are likely 
to channel their energies into voice, demanding that the organization improve 
its services. Th eir complaints use up resources, and can be costly and tiresome, 
and may put the organization in the position of either having to spend much 
money on rebutting and defending—and in the modern world dealing with 
lawsuits—or improve quality, which is likely to reduce proﬁ ts, since the organ-
ization has all the customers it can get anyway.
By contrast, if there is a certain limited exit option—not too easy or wide-
spread perhaps, but possible, one geared to the wishes of the demanding 
customers—then these may well take it. Th e organization is then left with the 
²⁰ A. O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and 
States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970).
²¹ ibid ch 3 (30–43).
²² ibid ch 5 (55–61).
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majority of passive customers, whom it can milk for high proﬁ ts while oﬀ ering 
second-rate services. In other words, losing your most expensive and diﬃ  cult cus-
tomers is not always bad news, if proﬁ t is what you care about.
Hirschman, an organizational scientist, is interested in the possibilities for 
business organizations to recover and improve, and this concern resonates once 
again in the context of welfare. He sums up the possibility of limited competi-
tion in a largely monolithic system in terms of ‘freedom to deteriorate’ for the 
dominant institution: there is no longer anyone forcing it to maintain quality.²³ 
Limited competition ‘comforts and bolsters’ the ‘lazy monopolist’.²⁴
It hardly seems controversial to suggest that this may be very relevant to wel-
fare services. If limited competition is introduced, the customers who may take 
advantage of it are the same ones who are most able to look after their own inter-
ests, most demanding of the system, and most capable of wielding political power 
and inﬂ uence to force that system to improve. Others, probably the majority, will 
be inclined to accept what they get, stick with the institution they know, and will 
experience slowly degrading services.
Th is is particularly so as a result of the complex and sensitive nature of welfare 
services. Th is makes it hard for a customer to truly judge the quality of what he 
receives. Hospitals simply wanting to come high in customer satisfaction rank-
ings would probably do better to teach their staﬀ  to smile a lot and provide free 
tea than invest in the latest treatments and advances. An analogous statement 
could be made of education. Secondly, because of the importance of the services 
to the individual, there will be a high motivation for customers to stick with what 
they know; the natural reaction to risk is to be conservative. Only those very 
conﬁ dent with the system and the issues will trust their judgement enough to 
change. Finally, it is the nature of these services that they change with society. 
Both education and healthcare are quite diﬀ erent now than even a few decades 
ago. Th is means that deterioration can take the form of standing still or even 
improving slowly, since it may be that technological and social changes mean 
that the potential is there for rapid and signiﬁ cant improvement. But like a frog 
in slowly warming water, the customer whose welfare services slowly improve, 
and only degrade in a relative sense, is even less likely to be provoked to resist-
ance than Hirschman’s passive customer prepared to accept slow deterioration 
in absolute terms. Unless very well informed about the possibilities, and able to 
understand them, how is the relative victim even to know he is a victim?
Th e argument above does not hold if those exiting instead of using voice would 
in fact have used voice to further their own interests only. Th en they were selﬁ sh 
participants, and their loss is no loss to others.²⁵ However, while speciﬁ c patient 
groups do have speciﬁ c interests, they also have many shared ones, and a generally 
²³ ibid 60.
²⁴ ibid 59.
²⁵ I am grateful to Georgio Monti for drawing my attention to this caveat.
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well-working system beneﬁ ts all. It is therefore assumed here that reforms that 
active and politically agile patient groups would like would also, on the whole 
and on balance, tend to beneﬁ t more passive groups too, so that the exit of these 
reform forces could work as described above.
3. Courts and welfare systems
3.1. Judicial review of welfare regulation
Governments making policy should be concerned with more than the most 
immediate and direct issues, but also with longer term ones. In designing welfare 
systems the most eﬀ ective treatment and teaching right now is important, but so 
is ensuring that the system is stable, enjoys support, and can go on developing 
and surviving. Further, the system is part of society as a whole, and contributes 
to its cohesion and identity. Governments concerned about the quality of life of 
their citizens—which might be inﬂ uenced by trust in society, social division and 
the criminal and social costs it brings, and the perception and actual pursuit of 
equality—must look at welfare institutions in context, and consider the contri-
bution they make beyond the concrete services they provide.
Th ey therefore have many legitimate reasons to structure their systems in ways 
which may be, to some extent, restrictive of change and individual freedom—of 
competition therefore—yet not all of those reasons can be expressed in terms 
of the narrowly functional requirements to provide the highest-quality services 
at the lowest cost to all customers now. Th e ‘communitarian’ reasons described 
above are broader, less direct, and to do with building relations and cohesion in 
society. Th ey are well expressed in terms of social capital.²⁶
Can courts review such reasons? Th e structure of EU law is such that it falls to 
the Court of Justice, and national courts acting under its supervision, to decide 
whether public measures restricting competition and free movement (or entry and 
exit, as one could put it) are justiﬁ ed by suﬃ  ciently weighty reasons of policy.²⁷ 
Th ey must balance the pros and cons to decide if a measure is to be struck down. Yet 
communitarian reasons are subtle, non-quantitative, subjective,  unprovable—the 
very essence of the kind of judgements that politicians make and courts rightly 
shy away from. In any other judicial review context it would probably be beyond 
question that judges would not second guess the judgement of authorities on such 
issues.²⁸ Th ey would engage in marginal, or purely procedural, review.
²⁶ B. Rothstein, ‘Social capital in the social democratic welfare state’ (2001) 29 Politics and 
Society 207.
²⁷ See J. Temple Lang, ‘Privatisation of Social Welfare: European Union Competition Law 
Rules’ in M. Dougan and E. Spaventa, Social Welfare and EU Law (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 45, 
55–64; E. Szyszczak, Th e Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU (Oxford: Hart, 
2007) 36–41.
²⁸ See C. Newdick, n 8 above, 1651–1653.
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However, marginal review in the context of EU law brings its own problems. 
Deferral to authority is not a ‘safe’ option here, because there is authority on two 
levels, and public authorities with policy interests in either possible decision. Th e 
European public authority’s choice to pursue open markets because of the social 
and economic advantages these bring confronts the national public authority’s 
choice to close the markets in the name of other social interests. Both are legit-
imate political policy-makers. Each accepts that they must sometimes bow to the 
other, the EU via its exceptions to economic law, and states via their acceptance 
of the supremacy of EU law.²⁹ Hence a judicial deference to policy choices and 
enthusiasm for marginal or procedural review oﬀ ers no way out. Even though 
the Court of Justice pays intermittent lip service to deference to member states, 
notably in the context of Article 106 TFEU, marginal review is a structurally 
inadequate response to the situation, which cannot be made adequate by judicial 
repetition.³⁰ Marginal review of which authority? Marginal review of national 
decisions amounts to marginalization of EU ones, overruling the legislator on the 
importance of entry and exit. It creates incentives for misuse of national discre-
tion at the cost of EU law, and is a non-sustainable legal position. On the other 
hand, marginal review of EU choices disregards complex policy balancing done 
by national authorities, and is ultimately destructive of good policy and ineﬃ  -
cient. What is judicial deference from one perspective is judicial activism from 
the other. A substantive engagement with the balancing process is unavoidable if 
law is to be a constructive social tool and if Treaty goals are to be taken seriously.
Th e conventional language of the internal market might speak of protectionism 
in a context like the above. Th is is one of the bogeymen of integration, and given 
the many social and economic dangers it brings, quite rightly so. Overcoming it 
has always been at the heart of EU policy, is one of the reasons for the existence 
of the EU, and so any judge should, and will, assume that public authorities at all 
levels, including the national—they joined the EU—must be taken to reject it. A 
strict line against protectionism is deferential, not activist.
Yet from the ‘outside’ it is diﬃ  cult to determine whether restrictions on entry 
and exit are motivated by protectionism or legitimate social concerns. Th is is pre-
cisely what a judge cannot be expected to get to the bottom of, because the line 
between the two is itself contestable and because of evidential reasons. However, 
if a governmental assurance that motives are good is suﬃ  cient, then adjudication 
of the issue becomes a farce. Th is would eﬀ ectively give member states an opt-out, 
and so undermine the eﬀ ectiveness of EU law that this fact alone could provide 
a challenge to the legality of such limited review.³¹ Th ere is implicitly a require-
ment to examine national measures more substantively and critically.
²⁹ Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
³⁰ See W. Sauter, ‘Services of general economic interest and universal services in EU law’ (2008) 
33 ELR 167, at 186–188.
³¹ See Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433; M. Accetto and S. Zleptnig, ‘Th e princi-
ple of eﬀ ectiveness: rethinking its role in Community law’ (2005) 11 Eur Public L 375.
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3.2. Essentialism in judicial reasoning
At the moment the Court is fairly deferential to member state concerns in this area, 
and uses three particular legal arguments to express that deference. One is the old 
but still oft-repeated rule of thumb that it is for member states to determine what 
sort of social welfare system they wish to have, while the Court will merely decide 
whether the operation of that system is compatible with the requirements of EU 
law.³² Of course, this distinction between the nature of the system and its operation 
cannot withstand a moment’s rigorous thinking. If a system is required to operate 
diﬀ erently, its nature changes, however marginally. Th e Court seems to be trying to 
express some kind of essentialism, a doctrine that the core principles and structures 
of the system are for the member states to determine, while others may be subject 
to market law requirements.³³ Essentialism is always a philosophically troublesome 
doctrine, and no less here than elsewhere.³⁴ In particular, the vulnerability of wel-
fare systems to ﬁ nancial pressure means that tinkering with what, conceptually or 
philosophically, seems a non-core element of the system may well have eﬀ ects that 
touch the core deeply, via the banal mechanism of signiﬁ cantly increasing costs.³⁵
Yet, despite its intellectual problems one could understand the Court’s approach 
as an attempt to respect the social concerns around welfare. It is a recognition that 
the ‘nature’ of the system embodies concerns judges cannot meaningfully engage 
with, and so they will conﬁ ne themselves to more practical, functional, measurable, 
reviewable issues—the ‘operation’. In practice, the Court’s nature/operation distinc-
tion appears to have no obvious impact on its judgments—the cases where member 
states have (partially) lost can certainly not be explained on the basis that the judg-
ments did not aﬀ ect core aspects of the principles or practice of the system: they did.³⁶ 
However it does provide a peg on which judgments can be hung, a way of putting 
judicial deference in the less defeatist language of the division of competences.
3.3. Th e use of evidence
A second technique that the Court is fond of is the acceptance of unpersuasive 
evidence. When it ﬁ nds that a measure is necessary or unnecessary, justiﬁ ed or 
unjustiﬁ ed, it does so in sonorously objective tones, as if its decision is the inevitable 
³² eg Case C-103/06, Derouin, judgment of 3 April 2008, paras 23–25; Case C-385/99 Müller-
Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para 100, and citations therein.
³³ For analogous reasoning in other contexts, see Case 15/74 Centrafarm v Sterling [1974] ECR 
1147; Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] 
ECR I-11613.
³⁴ D. J. Levinson, ‘Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration’ (June 1999) University of 
Virginia Law School, Legal Studies Working Paper No 99–5. Available on <http://ssrn.com>.
³⁵ C. Newdick, n 8 above.
³⁶ eg concerning core principles of the relevant service provision: Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] 
ECR I-4325; Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-157/99 
Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-65/03 Commission v Belgium [2004] 
ECR I-6427; Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969.
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conclusion of careful perusal of the evidence. However, a quick look at the cases on 
welfare, particularly those concerning free movement, reveals that it makes highly 
speculative and controversial assertions. Th e claim, for example, that allowing 
patients to travel at will for non-hospital medical treatment will not signiﬁ cantly 
undermine the ﬁ nances of health systems, whereas allowing them to travel at will 
for hospital treatment would, may be true, but one can be quite sure that it is not 
self-evidently so on the basis of the evidence presented.³⁷ Th ere is still plenty of 
research to be done on this issue, and frankly nobody knows quite what would hap-
pen.³⁸ Th e Court decided on what seemed like a reasonable middle position on the 
basis of evidence that may have been suggestive, but was not conclusive. Perhaps 
one should understand this—certainly as a UK lawyer—as a simple application of 
the civil law ‘balance of probabilities’ approach to deciding a case. An alternative 
interpretation is that in these complicated welfare contexts states discharge their 
evidential duty if they can make a reasonable case, or raise a presumption, that their 
measures are necessary and justiﬁ ed. Th ey do not have to prove it; that would be 
too hard. Th e question that remains open is how courts would respond to counter-
evidence from litigants—they do not appear to have seriously attempted to rebut 
state claims of necessity in cases so far, at least insofar as one can judge from the 
opinions of Advocate Generals and the judgments.³⁹ Th e question is made more 
complex by the fact that formally it is for national courts to assess evidence, accord-
ing to national rules.⁴⁰ Although in practice the Court of Justice often does decide 
issues of fact, it also often expressly refers them back.⁴¹ Not just the how, but the 
who, of determining what is in reality necessary or not remains legally ambiguous.
Both of these techniques of reasoning give judges room for ﬂ exibility. But that 
ﬂ exibility is only in a good cause if the judges do in fact judge, at least to some 
degree, the substantive issue. Th ey do have to decide whether measures really are 
socially important or just protectionist, and implicitly this is what they are doing 
when they decide cases nominally on a functional basis, but with gaps in logic 
and evidence. Th ose gaps are where the other, judicially unnameable, subjective 
and political, arguments do their work. Judges are therefore deciding on the social 
value and social sustainability of welfare systems, and weighing this against other 
interests, and they are probably aware that they are doing so, but they admit none 
³⁷ See Watts, ibid para 75; Müller-Fauré and van Riet, ibid para 93; See also Commission v 
Austria, ibid paras 64–66; G. Davies, ‘Health and eﬃ  ciency: Community law and national health 
systems in the light of Müller-Fauré ’ (2004) 67 MLR 94, at 104.
³⁸ J. V. McHale, ‘Framing a right to treatment in English law? Watts in retrospective’ (2007) 14 
Maastricht J of Eur and Comparative L 263, at 278–282.
³⁹ See n 37 above.
⁴⁰ See eg K.Lenaerts, D. Arts and I. Maselis. Procedural Law of the EU (2nd edn, London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2006) 187–193.
⁴¹ ibid; G. Davies, ‘Abstractness and concreteness in the preliminary reference procedure’ in Niamh 
Nic Shuibhne (ed) Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006) 210. Also availa-
ble as ‘Th e Division of Powers between the European Court of Justice and National Courts on <http://
ssrn.com> and as ConWeb Working Paper 2004/04, <http://www.bath.ac.uk/esml/conWEB>.
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of it; they speak exclusively the language of functional requirements—quality of 
service, accessibility, price—and of competence and evidence.
3.4. Solidarity as a legal justiﬁ cation
Th e third legal technique that the Court (increasingly) relies on is the reference to 
solidarity.⁴² Th is has been used in a number of cases as a justiﬁ cation for restric-
tive measures.⁴³ Th e Court understands the concept in a narrowly functional 
way, using it simply to mean redistribution within the system.⁴⁴ It has found at 
times that systems founded ‘on the principle of solidarity’ are therefore not eco-
nomic activities, and so not subject to internal market rules.⁴⁵
Th is is not particularly persuasive. Neither solidarity nor compulsory mem-
bership make an activity non-economic in the normal—economic—sense of the 
words. Th e fact that a system entails redistribution certainly does not, for ex-
ample, mean that it is not an economic activity. Th ere are few more redistributive 
activities than ﬂ ying, in which business class passengers pay most of the costs of 
those sitting in the cheaper seats behind them. Th e Marxist ‘from each accord-
ing to his abilities’ approach is now conventional business technique, more often 
criticized as abuse of capitalist power, under the label of ‘price discrimination’, 
than as incipient socialism. Compulsory membership is more interesting, but 
even this need not render an activity non-economic; the fact that an individual 
is required to purchase a service from a given provider does not mean that there 
is not a genuine exchange of value, or that the provider is not engaging in an 
activity which could take place on a market, the two core elements which the 
Court uses in deﬁ ning economic activity.⁴⁶ Th e same argument holds when 
looked at from a more everyday perspective; the fact that an organization has a 
monopoly over certain customers does not mean that it does not behave in a ruth-
lessly commercial way—in fact it may well encourage it—and that it redistributes 
between those customers does not aﬀ ect this logic in the least. Th us compul-
sory participation in a system based on solidarity provides no rational reason to 
classify the system as non-economic.
⁴² See M. Ross, ‘Promoting solidarity. From public services to a European model of competi-
tion’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 1057; C. Barnard, ‘EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity’ in M. 
Dougan and E. Spaventa Social Welfare and EU Law (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 157.
⁴³ Case C-159/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637; Case C-70/96 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395; 
Case C-264/01 AOK [2004] ECR I-2493; Case C-115/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025; C-219/97 
Drijvende Bokken [1999] ECR I-6021; Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691; Case C-244/94 FFSA 
[1995] ECR I-4013; Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751; C-180/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451.
⁴⁴ ibid.
⁴⁵ Case C-205/030 P, FENIN [2006] ECR I-6295; Case C-159/91, Poucet and Pistre [1993] 
ECR I-637; Case C-70/96 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395; Case C-264/01 AOK [2004] ECR I-2493; 
Case C-115/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025; C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999] ECR I-6021; 
Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691.
⁴⁶ See G. Davies, ‘Th e process and side eﬀ ects of harmonisation of European welfare states’, 
n 3 above, 18–21.
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More importantly, compulsory membership and internal solidarity do not pro-
vide functional reasons for restricting competition. Solidarity can be achieved quite 
straightforwardly in a system without compulsory membership, and without shared 
institutions, by requiring everyone to pay tax, which is then redistributed. For exam-
ple, subsidized health insurance and commercial provision of healthcare, or subsi-
dized education vouchers and commercial provision of education, achieve the core 
solidarity eﬀ ect of ensuring universal access with diﬀ ering degrees of ﬁ nancial con-
tribution.⁴⁷ Yet such approaches do not replace markets for healthcare and education 
by monopoly institutions, or even public institutions. Solidarity as such, in a func-
tional sense, does not steer policy away from or towards markets and competition, 
except where the extremes of market freedom are approached. It is organizationally 
neutral. It does not therefore, if understood functionally, provide a coherent argu-
ment against the claimed merits of liberalization and fragmentation of welfare.
Th us when the Court says that economic law does or should not apply because 
an institution embodies solidarity, it makes no sense to interpret this as meaning 
that the application of economic law would undermine this solidarity; in most 
cases it need not do this at all. Nor does it make sense to interpret the statement as 
meaning that where solidarity is present there is no economic activity; this is not 
true either, as the Court in fact recognizes in other cases. ⁴⁸ Solidarity—often in 
the form of public subsidy—can be importantly present even while individuals 
also provide remuneration that covers a great deal, perhaps the majority, of the 
value of the service,⁴⁹ or while an organization engages in activity on a market.⁵⁰ 
Subsidy does not have to be a hundred per cent of cost to matter.
Th e remaining, and best interpretation of the use of solidarity is that it serves as 
a cipher for communitarian reasons; where institutions embody solidarity this both 
reﬂ ects, demonstrates, and bestows, a special social value and role. Th is is why, at 
least sometimes, economic law should not be allowed to deconstruct them, and so 
why it should not apply, or its application should be restricted. On this reading of the 
cases the Court, when it allows restrictions on economic law, is implicitly acknow-
ledging the communitarian reasons for restricting competition and prizing monop-
olistic institutions, even though it cannot voice those reasons explicitly, lacking the 
vocabulary to do so, and perhaps aware of the controversy it would arouse.
Th us, a judicial awareness of subtle social values is again to be found in the gaps 
in judicial reasoning, and in the fact that social values often do prevail over purely 
economic ones, without the reasons provided for this being fully convincing; 
⁴⁷ See eg F. Paulucci, A. Den Exter and W. van de Ven, ‘Solidarity in competitive health insurance 
markets: analysing the relevant EC legal framework’ (2006) 1 Health Economics, Policy and Law 107.
⁴⁸ V. G. Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but healing Patients? 
Th e European Market for Health Care Services After the Judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and 
Peerbooms’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 683, at 705–713; G. Davies, ‘Th e process and side eﬀ ects of har-
monisation of European welfare states’, n 3 above, 20–21.
⁴⁹ eg Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447; Case C-76/05 Schwarz, judgment of 11 
September 2007.
⁵⁰ Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elsner [1991] ECR I-1979; cases in n 43 above.
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there is more going on in the case law than judges choose to say. Solidarity is the 
blanket under which this furtive communitarianism takes place.
4. Conclusions
Th ere is much to be said for courts saying openly what they are doing, but the fact 
that the Court of Justice does not is the result of the diﬃ  cult position it has been put 
in. Decisions have been placed in the judicial sphere which do not ideally belong 
there. It can ignore communitarian justiﬁ cations, leading to bad decisions, or it can 
consider them but mask them in conventional legal language, or it can start speaking 
in the language of social capital, cohesion, voice and exit, and such social-theoretical 
terms. It is not hard to see why it avoids this latter path. It is interesting language, but 
it is not easy language to rest a proof on—judicial authority is quite possibly main-
tained more by tactical omissions than by full but subjective explanations, particu-
larly in a court that often seems to have diﬃ  culty expressing itself clearly anyway and 
is heir to, among others, minimalist and legalist continental traditions.⁵¹
Th e major reason why the Court has been lumbered with its diﬃ  cult task is the 
diversity of national welfare systems and rules, which makes detailed regulation 
at EU level practically impossible.⁵² EU law in this area is inevitably at a relatively 
abstract and principled level, with the consequence that judges have lots of work 
left over to do.
Th is provides a reason to be sceptical of proposals for legislation on Services 
of General (Economic) Interest.⁵³ Th e fact that there is a problem, a conﬂ ict of 
interest, and a dissatisfaction with leaving these matters to courts, does not mean 
that legislation is a solution. It will run up against the same diversity of systems, 
and very likely be forced into the same kind of relatively abstract rules as the 
Court has developed. Th e consequence will be that the nature of the judicial bal-
ancing required does not really change.
Th e parties who could do more to ‘solve’ the problem of balancing the 
immeasurable are member states. If the Advocate General’s opinions and the judg-
ments are a fair guide then the nature and quality of their arguments in the cases 
are unimpressive, and suggest some branches of government are not engaging 
with the obligations EU membership entails. On the contrary, EU demands are 
neither new nor unpredictable, and it is surely reasonable to expect states to pro-
actively look for a defensible compromise between their own social policy and 
the EU policies of openness and integration. A true picture of the extent to which 
⁵¹ M. Lasser, ‘Anticipating Th ree Models of Judicial Control, Debate and Legitimacy: Th e 
European Court of Justice, the Cour de cassation and the United States Supreme Court’ Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 1/03. Available at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org>.
⁵² F. Scharpf, ‘Th e European social model’ n 6 above.
⁵³ See the Commission’s ‘White Paper on Services of General Interest’ COM (2004) 374 ﬁ nal, 
12 May 2004.
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they are doing this would require an extensive—but very worthwhile—empirical 
survey. A survey of the case law provides many examples of manifestly indefens-
ible practices, and suggests that more could certainly be done.⁵⁴ Taking subtle 
concerns about exit seriously will be easier if judges, and the Commission, can see 
that states are genuinely attempting to engage with the positive aspects of it too.
It would be a shame to see the picture solely in terms of the tensions between 
openness and cohesion, liberty and solidarity, welfare and the market, however. 
Th ere are at least two other interpretations possible which deserve consideration. 
Th e liberalization of welfare can be understood as a statement or suggestion that 
Europe is politically mature, and no longer needs closed institutions to maintain 
its social cohesion—it can now have the best of both worlds, of freedom and soli-
darity. Th e compulsory, institutional maintenance of certain values treats these 
as delicate ﬂ owers, and is prepared to sacriﬁ ce other interests to protect them. But 
if those ﬂ owers are surprisingly robust and have grown strong roots the sacriﬁ ce 
may be redundant, and even harmful; a system that restricts freedom unneces-
sarily comes into discredit. Whether solidarity is a suﬃ  ciently rooted value that 
citizens will maintain their commitment to each other even if given the freedom 
to fragment and reorganize is of course diﬃ  cult to predict. Ultimately the answer 
will be known only by experiment, and the cautious liberalization that the EU is 
imposing may be that experiment. Th e fear that it evokes may then be understood 
as a fear of ourselves, that we are in fact not ready for freedom—perhaps given the 
chance we will rush oﬀ  and be selﬁ sh and abandon the weak to their fate. To use 
the European’s (unjustiﬁ ed) stereotype of the United States; are we just Americans 
waiting to be released, or do we really have rooted European social values?⁵⁵
Th e liberalization project can also be understood as part of the creation of a 
Europe-wide expression of welfare solidarity, which is less the creation of an EU 
welfare empire than an attempt to place national societies ﬁ rmly in the context of 
neighbouring ones that share similar values, and thereby to turn the logic of commu-
nitarian monopoly on itself; if shared participation in a common project strengthens 
bonds, then making states transparently part of a wider community of states com-
mitted to welfare and solidarity should perhaps achieve the same eﬀ ect on a larger 
scale.⁵⁶ Reaching the right compromise between national openness and national 
institutions is not a balance between cohesion and freedom, but about trying to use 
freedom to actually strengthen that cohesion—at least that may be the dream.
⁵⁴ No competent lawyer could have advised the Dutch, British, Greek, or German governments 
that they had a reasonable chance in Müller-Fauré, Watts, Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR 
I-3185, Case C-8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I-2641, Schwarz, and many others.
⁵⁵ G. Davies, ‘Th e process and side-eﬀ ects of the harmonisation of European welfare states’, n 
3 above, 63–64.
⁵⁶ J. Habermas, Th e Post-National Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
05-Ross_Ch05.indd   121 2/22/2010   6:07:04 PM
